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Chapter 4:
The Institutional Economics of Corruption   
Susan Rose-Ackerman       
Contemporary research on the institutional economics of corruption began
with theoretical work that built on industrial organization, public finance, and
price theory to isolate the incentives for paying and receiving bribes and to
recommend policy responses based on that theory. My own 1978 book, Cor-
ruption: A Study in Political Economy, is an early example with its relatively
straightforward application of economic concepts to the study of corruption.
It used economic theory to understand what programs were especially sus-
ceptible to corruption and to recommend ways to reduce these incentives.
That book largely relied on journalism to supply the facts because there were
no statistical efforts to measure the harm caused by corruption. The closest
empirical work by Anne Krueger (1974) and Jagdish Bhagwati (1974) mea-
sured the volume of rent seeking and illegal transactions in international trade
by using the two sets of books available internationally – in exporting and in
importing countries. Fortunately, in recent years it has become possible to
move beyond journalism. Although empirical work on a topic that involves
illegal activity remains difficult, empirical work employs a range of clever
devices to generate quantitative estimates.
This chapter summarizes the institutional economics framework that con-
tinues to yield important insights into the causes and consequences of cor-
ruption. After introducing the conceptual framework, it discusses empirical
research derived from this theoretical perspective and includes some thoughts
on fruitful directions for future research.
1. The institutional economics framework
Corruption occurs where private wealth and public power overlap. It repre-
sents the illicit use of willingness-to-pay as a decision-making criterion. A
private individual or firm makes a payment to a public official in return for a
benefit or to avoid a cost. Bribes increase the private wealth of officials and
may induce them to take actions that are against the interest of their princi-
pals, who may be bureaucratic superiors, politically appointed ministers, or
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multiple principals, such as the general public. Illicit payments may also flow
in the reverse direction. Those holding or competing for public office may
make cash payments to private individuals, firms, or other officials to get
benefits for themselves or their political parties. In both cases, pathologies in
the agency/principal relation are at the heart of the corrupt transaction.
Whether the principal is a single, named superior or a diffuse body like
the public at large, the essential point in that corruption represents the viola-
tion of an obligation or a duty in return for a private benefit. Officials or
politicians who accept bribes violate the trust placed in them. Politicians who
pay bribes to obtain political support undermine the legitimacy of democratic
politics. Deterrence either can focus on changing the economic incentives to
pay or receive bribes, or can increase the trustworthiness of agents by other
means, such as seeking to instill a sense of loyalty and commitment to par-
ticular public institutions or to the general public interest. Bo Rothstein
(2010) criticizes the principal/agent approach by arguing that thoroughly cor-
rupt systems lack a benevolent principal. Even when the principal is the gen-
eral public, Rothstein (2010) points out that voters frequently reelect corrupt
politicians, perhaps because politicians pay for voters’ support in the form of
outright monetary payoffs of pork barrel projects. This critique, it seems to
me, proves too much. First, individual identifiable principals who are harmed
by the corruption of their subordinates are quite common, and they can be
expected to support efforts to limit lower level corruption. Second, voters in
some political system do punish corrupt politicians at the polls so long as a
more honest alternative exists. Furthermore, if corrupt candidates are re-
elected, one cannot conclude that voters necessarily approve of corruption
but only that they have not been offered a credible, honest alternative. In the
worst case that Rothstein (2010) posits, where the entire government hierar-
chy is on the take and voters prefer politicians who buy their votes, I agree
that it does not make sense to consider piecemeal reforms. In such a system,
with no separation between personal enrichment and public service, the
agency/principal model is not a useful explanatory tool or guide to policy.
However, it does not follow from the possible existence of such pathological
cases that the principal/agent model is not a useful framework for the general
run of cases.
Rothstein (2010) stresses the problem of vicious spirals where the cor-
ruption of some breeds the corruption of others until almost all are corrupt.
This phenomenon is well-recognized in the economic analysis of corruption
and can arise both from limited law enforcement resources and from rein-
forcing attitudes in which those who observe others’ corruption begin to view
such behavior as acceptable simply because it is common (Andvig/Moene
1990; Bardhan 1997: 1330-1334; Rose-Ackerman 1999: 107-109, 124-125).
Rothstein (2010) argues that in such cases corruption cannot be limited
through piecemeal, incremental reforms, and I agree. However, that conclu-
sion is not a refutation of the principal/agency approach. The two approaches
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are complements, not substitutes. Multiple equilibria models with vicious and
virtuous cycles can arise under any of the principal/agent situations outlined
in the institutional economics literature. Thus an entire police force or cus-
toms service can become corrupt over time with the level of corruption in one
period leading to a higher level the next period. True, such corruption could
move up the hierarchy over time, but that is not a necessary result of such
spirals at one level.
Rothstein (2010) provides an interesting analysis of one set of conditions
favorable to vicious spirals – programs that target a portion of the population
and require officials to make individualized judgments in allocating benefits
or imposing costs. This can, as Rothstein argues, undermine a norm of im-
partiality and produce corruption. However, Rothstein (2010) wants to define
corruption as equivalent to this norm violation. He follows Oscar Kurer’s
definition of corruption as occurring when ‘a holder of public office vio-
lat[es] … the impartiality principle in order to achieve a private gain’ (Kurer
2005: 230). To me, this definition confuses a normative issue – one type of
harm caused by corruption – with the phenomenon under study. It exces-
sively narrows the field of study to one particular, if important, type of harm.
Although I agree that defining corruption as the misuse of public power for
private gain leaves the key terms underspecified, it opens up a broad field of
debate over the meaning of ‘misuse’ which may indeed vary across societies.
Some of the most interesting issues in corruption research involve just such
debates over the relative costs of different types of corruption in different
settings. Rothstein (2010) would simply short circuit that debate by privileg-
ing one of the many costs of systemic corruption.
For me, a more fruitful approach is to describe the range of phenomena
under study and to assess the relative costs of each relative to the costs of
prevention. This may involve difficult tradeoffs between competing values
that cannot easily be measured using a common metric, but that approach
promises a richer and more nuanced set of research questions. Thus, I do not
see the principal/agent approach as a restrictive one. It may fail to take ac-
count of dynamic factors and social forces, but it provides a valuable place to
start and places the burden of proof on those wishing either to add additional
complementary factors, such as vicious cycles, or to substitute an entirely dif-
ferent approach.
What then is the essence of that approach? Principals and agents operate
within an institutional context. The insights of institutional economics are
closely related to the economic analysis of corruption. Institutional econo-
mists and their political science fellow travelers stress the way the institu-
tional context affects the behavior of individuals. They respond to the incen-
tives, both carrots and sticks, created by institutions, broadly defined. The
next step in the analysis is to study the incentives that face those with politi-
cal and economic power to change the institutional structure in their favor.
For a good introduction to the ambition and scope of the approach one should
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consult the seminal work of Douglas North and his collaborators spanning
thirty years (e.g. North 1981; North 1990; North/Weingast 1989; North/
Wallis/Weingast 2009. See also Greif 2006). A top public official or private
firm executive might reorganize an organization to create a more centralized
structure or, conversely, to decentralize decision making to give more
authority to those lower in the hierarchy or even to eliminate the hierarchy
entirely (Williamson 1975). Political economists with an institutional focus
study such questions as the impact of bureaucratic reorganization on public
performance, the effect of privatizing formerly public services, the relative
merits of presidential and parliamentary democracies, and the role of inde-
pendent courts, central banks, and regulatory agencies. They study both how
people and firms respond to existing institutions as well as the political and
economic incentives to change institutional forms (for overviews see, e.g.,
Mueller 2003; Weingast 2002; Weingast/Wittman 2006).
Some of this analysis, both theoretical and empirical, discusses corruption
along with other incentives to shirk through laziness or a desire for leisure or
views it as part of the general tendency toward rent seeking in public life
(North/Weingast 1989; North/Wallis/Weingast 2009). It asks how political
incentives change with changes in government organization and studies how
incentives and opportunities can lead to institutional change. However, cor-
ruption is seldom the subject of detailed analysis. Recent work on corruption
from a wider range of scholars is helping to remedy that lack, but it needs to
be more closely integrated into the general fields of political economy and in-
stitutional analysis (for one example of such an effort see Glaeser/Goldin
2006).
The economic analysis of corruption models private individuals and firms
outside government as active players. They do not passively vote for politi-
cians, apply for public benefits, or bid for contracts. Rather they strategically
interact with officials and politicians to further their own interests. Corrupt
officials may pressure them for payoffs by, but they may also actively seek to
subvert public programs to favor themselves. They may accept payoffs from
politicians in return for their votes or pay politicians to get private benefits.
The basic framework follows research on rent seeking in institutional eco-
nomics but is more nuanced and complex. The problem for principals is not
just to incentivize agents but also to confront the three-sided nature of trans-
actions between principals, public agents, and the outsiders with whom they
must deal. Some of the insights generated by the analysis of corruption in the
public sector apply to any hierarchy, public or private. Although mechanisms
of control may differ between public and private entities, many of the same
incentives for corruption arise (Rose-Ackerman 1978: 189-209).
The institutional economics of corruption highlights the way bribery af-
fects both the efficiency and the fairness of public sector actions. Agency/
principal relations pervade government, and most agents either deal directly
with the public or have access to public resources that could be appropriated
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for their own benefit. Hence, it is important both to find loci of corrupt in-
centives and to ask how corruption might affect the effectiveness of govern-
ment action. In other words, there is both a positive and a normative aspect to
the analysis. Some institutional economic analysis claims to be purely posi-
tive. It does not make judgments but simply reports how the incentives cre-
ated by different institutions can be expected to affect behavior. This neutral
stance is not possible in the analysis of corruption, a loaded term that comes
with its own normative baggage. Rather one needs to combine institutional
economics with welfare economics to assess the impact of corruption on
government functioning in terms of both efficiency and fairness.
Begin with a simple corrupt situation. Bribes paid to agents may distort
their choices away from the aims of their principals. If those aims further the
efficient allocation of resources, bribery is inefficient. The analysis, however,
extends beyond efficiency. If, for example, the goal of a public program is to
benefit the poor or to select the most qualified, substituting willingness-to-
pay for these criteria undermines the program’s goals. In general, bribes are
not just transfers from one pocket to another. They affect the behavior of
those who pay and those who receive payoffs. In this they are similar to
prices or to contractual terms. They provide incentives that work against the
aims of a public program or, at least, increase its cost to the beneficiaries
(Rose-Ackerman 1978: 137-166; 1999: 7-26).
To proceed, I differentiate between low-level opportunistic payoffs, on
the one hand, and systemic corruption, on the other, that implicates an entire
bureaucratic hierarchy, electoral system, or overall governmental structure
from top to bottom.
Low-level corruption occurs within a given institutional framework where
basic laws and regulations are in place, and implementing officials seize upon
opportunities to benefit personally. Here is where the principal/agent model
is most obviously applicable. There are several generic situations.
First, a public benefit may be scarce, and officials may have discretion to
assign it to applicants. Suppose that superiors cannot observe payoffs but can
easily check if any unqualified applicants receive the benefit. Then the quali-
fied applicants with the highest willingness to pay and the fewest scruples
will get the benefit in a corrupt system. This would seem the least problem-
atic case from an economic efficiency perspective. The payoff is a transfer,
and the benefit goes to those who value it the most in dollar terms. The main
problems are the transaction costs of corrupt deals and the elimination of
qualified beneficiaries with high scruples. The obvious policy response is to
sell the benefit legally. It is a good test of this strategy to ask if any signifi-
cant public policy goal would be violated by charging fees as a rationing de-
vice. For example, if a country has a limited supply of import licenses to al-
locate, selling them to the high bidder will usually be the efficient strategy.
Most economists would recommend doing away with import quotas entirely,
but if that is not an option, an auction is second best. Related cases are trans-
Susan Rose-Ackerman52
parent auctions for privatized firms and broadcast licenses, and competitive
bidding for contracts.
Second, consider the ways in which the first example is idealized. In par-
ticular, suppose that low-level officials are required to select only qualified
applicants and that their exercise of discretion cannot be perfectly monitored.
The overall supply may be scarce, as in the above example (for example,
university places or government-subsidized apartments), or open-ended (for
example, driver’s licenses, business firm registration, certificates of occu-
pancy for new construction). In either case, the officials’ discretion permits
them to collect bribes from both the qualified and the unqualified. The level
of corruption will depend upon the options for the qualified. For example,
can they approach another, potentially honest, official? If they can, no indi-
vidual corrupt official has much bargaining power and so cannot extract high
payoffs. In some cases, inter-official competition might push bribes so low
that they are no longer worth accepting given the risks of disclosure (Rose-
Ackerman 1978: 137-150, Shleifer/Vishny 1993). Incentives for payoffs will
also depend upon the ability of superiors to monitor allocations. For example,
a firm that builds a shoddy building may be able to hide the flaws, at least until
it is tested in a fire or an earthquake. Government contracting and the sale of
state assets by lower level officials also often fit this case. Superiors cannot per-
fectly monitor official behavior so lower level bureaucrats can collect bribes
that permit contracts to be given to poorly qualified firms and that allow asset
sales to bidders who do not provide the state with the highest return.
Third, the bureaucratic process itself may be a source of delay and other
costs. In that case incentives for corruption arise as applicants try to get to the
head of the queue or otherwise get better service. To further exploit their cor-
rupt opportunities, officials may create or threaten to create red tape as a
means of extracting bribes. This strategy is plausible in many real world ap-
plications because even honest officials need to take some time and trouble to
process applications.
Turn next to cases in which officials impose costs rather than benefits –
for example, they seek to collect taxes or threaten citizens with arrest. They
can then extract payoffs in return for overlooking the illegal underpayment of
taxes or for tolerating illegal gambling and drug operations. More pathologi-
cally, they can demand payoffs in exchange for refraining from arresting
people on trumped up charges.
Each of these potentially corrupt situations raises the question of how
bribery occurs. What explaines difference across individuals and societies in
the incidence and level of payoffs? Part of the answer lies in the institutional
framework that determines the nature and extent of the opportunities outlined
above. However, within a given institutional environment, economic theory
is poorly equipped to explain variation across individuals who face the same
structural incentives. Some people clearly have more moral scruples or fear
of exposure and punishment than others. Long-term, stable trusting relation-
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ship further corruption in some cases and substitute for bribery in others.
Both individual attitudes toward illegal activities and interpersonal relations
affect the extent of corruption and the choices of individuals. However, given
some background level of individual scruples and inter-personal solidarity,
economics predicts that institutional changes that increase financial benefits
and reduce costs will increase the incidence of corruption. The level of bribes
paid is a function of the benefit at stake, the relative bargaining power of
bribe payers and recipients, the risk of exposure, and expected punishments.
Both cultural factors and objective measures of deterrence are important.
Consider, for example, Fisman and Miguel’s (2007) study of violations of
traffic laws in New York City by United Nations diplomats. During a period
when the law was not enforced against them, the level of violations was
roughly correlated with Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions
Index. However, the overall level of violations fell dramatically after a
change in policy that gave the embassies an incentive to pay. Both financial
penalties and ‘culture’ mattered.
In general, low-level corruption can lead to the inefficient and unfair dis-
tribution of scarce benefits, undermine the purposes of public programs, en-
courage officials to create red tape, increase the cost of doing business and
limit entry, and lower state legitimacy. Notice, however, that corruption may
have political benefits for incumbent politicians. The bribes may be paid at
the lowest level in the hierarchy, but they may be part of an organized system
that is used to favor political allies and to build campaign war chests, and not
only to obtain individual cash benefits. At that point low-level corruption
merges with high-level corruption.
 ‘Grand’ corruption shares some features with low-level payoffs, but it
can be more deeply destructive of state functioning – bringing the state to the
edge of outright failure and undermining the economy. The analysis of grand
corruption must account for the possibility that top officials and politicians
will create institutional environments that facilitate their illicit enrichment.
Unlike low-level corruption, the institutional structure can be modified to in-
crease the value of corrupt deals. To capture the reality of some cases we
need to take account of the role of powerful non-governmental actors, be they
large firms, criminal mafias, or other powerful bodies. Here, I assume that the
general public is the principal and is harmed by grand corruption. However,
this harm can occur even if ordinary citizens know nothing about corruption
and the harm it causes. In that case, they are not in a position to correct the
problem. Efforts at reform initiated by outsiders need to begin by convincing
the populace that their interests are being undermined by corruption. In some
cases, however, even if the damage done by corruption can be documented,
no one may have the power or the political will to make systemic changes. I
distinguish three variants.
First, a branch of the public sector may be organized as a rent extraction
machine. For example, top police officials may organize large scale corrupt
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systems in collaboration with organized crime groups, who are given a de
facto monopoly on illicit activities. In practice, it may be difficult to know
whether the police or the criminals have the upper hand. In the extreme, po-
lice may even arrest members of competing groups so as to maintain the
dominant group’s monopoly. Policing is probably the most dramatic example
here, but tax collection agencies and regulatory inspectorates, to name just
two, can also degenerate into corrupt systems where high-level officials man-
age and share in the gains of their inferiors (Das-Gupta/Mookerjee 1998;
Rose-Ackerman 1978: 109-136; 1999: 27-38). These cases provide particu-
larly strong examples of the vicious spirals discussed above. The princi-
pal/agent model still applies, but the proximate principal inside the bureauc-
racy becomes a pure rent-extracting body. Reform cannot occur without a
thoroughgoing restructuring of the corrupt body that will require replacing
personnel, changing its tasks, and introducing outside oversight, perhaps
from civil society (Bardhan 1997: 1330-1334; Rose-Ackerman 1999: 107-
109; Rothstein 2010).
Second, a nominal democracy may have a corrupt electoral system, with
money determining the outcome. Here, there are many slippery slopes and
difficult lines to draw. Political campaigns require funds from either public or
private sources. Voters need to be persuaded to support particular candidates
in one way or another, and corruption can enter in four ways. It can under-
mine limits on spending, get around limits on the types of spending permitted
(that is, no direct quid pro quos), and subvert controls on the sources of
funds. Finally, politicians may make payoffs to voters to get their support.
There is no agreement about what should count as ‘corrupt’ in this context.
The extremes are clear – vote buying and outright quid pro quo purchases of
public benefits, but the more subtle distinctions are hotly contested (Rose-
Ackerman 1978: 15-85; 1999: 127-174). Here as well, the analysis of cor-
ruption supplements work that studies the tradeoffs between the search for
campaign funds and appeals to ordinary voters but ignores illegal behavior.
Third, governments engage in large projects can transfer assets in ways
that have a significant effect on the wealth of domestic and foreign busi-
nesses. For example, they regularly contract for major construction projects
such as highways and port improvements, allocate natural resource conces-
sions, and privatize state-owned firms. High-level politicians may organize
state institutions so that they can use their influence to collect kickbacks from
private firms in all of these areas. The relative power of government officials
and private interests may, in practice, be difficult to sort out. The extremes are
kleptocracy, on the one hand, and state capture by powerful private interests, on
the other. In some cases, concentrated power exists on both sides, and the in-
stitutional structure is a bargaining situation similar to a bilateral monopoly in
the private market (Andreski 1968; Johnston 2005; Kahn/Jomo 2000).
Grand corruption can undermine state legitimacy and economic func-
tioning. Most problematic is bilateral monopoly, where a narrow set of pow-
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erful public and private figures controls the state. Some scholars dispute this
claim. Using a market analogy, they observe that a monopolist seeks produc-
tive efficiency, and, in the presence of external effects and free riding, it is
better to centralize power over resources. In Mancur Olson’s term (1993), a
‘stationary bandit’ is better than a large number of ‘roving bandits’. The evi-
dence suggests, however, that most kleptocrats do not act like efficient mo-
nopolists. They are not that powerful. Far from choosing efficient projects
that maximize monopoly profits, they need to buy off supporters. Given the
risk of losing power, they often transfer their profits outside the country for
safekeeping. The analogy to a private monopolist misses these aspects of
kleptocratic government (Rose-Ackerman 1999: 114-124; Rose-Ackerman
2003).
Some claim that deep historical factors are the fundamental determinants
of corruption and also can explain the impact of corruption on economic
growth and other variables. If true, then one might conclude that countries
cannot escape their history – some countries’ pasts inexorably generate cor-
ruption. But that policy conclusion is overly pessimistic. Some statistical
work uses historical factors for identifying purposes because they are clearly
independent of present-day institutions. Thus, they solve the problem of si-
multaneous causation. Statistical work variously finds that settler mortality,
colonial heritage, religion, and distance from the equator are good proxies for
today’s institutional structures (e.g., Acemoglu/Johnson/Robinson 2001). But
these results do not imply that a country with background conditions associ-
ated with corruption and low growth cannot change, although it does suggest
that change may need to be more radical and far reaching than in other coun-
tries. The massive transformations that have occurred in Central Europe, the
former Soviet Union, China, and Vietnam demonstrate that change is possi-
ble and can occur quite rapidly. The transitions to democracy in Latin Amer-
ica and Asia, however unfinished and rough-edged, demonstrate the same
point. Furthermore, in countries where widespread corruption has gone along
with a strong growth performance, one can seek to understand both why cor-
ruption did not hold back growth and whether corruption had a disparate im-
pact on particular sectors and social groups who bear the brunt of the corrupt
gains earned by others. Such research could provide a more nuanced ap-
proach to policy-oriented studies that aim to understand how government and
private sector institutions affect economic outcomes and the legitimacy of the
state.
Research in anthropology and sociology stresses that cultural and social
factors determine the level of corruption and explain why behavior is seen as
corrupt in some societies but not in others (see de Zwart, this volume). Here
too, the important issue from a policy perspective is whether these factors are
exogenous or whether people react to others’ behavior. For example, trust
and trustworthiness can be a function of the behavior of others (Hardin
2002). A rational person will trust only those he or she believes are trust-
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worthy. A person may be trustworthy not only as a result of moral scruples
but also as a way of benefiting from the trust of others over time. In addition,
people’s view of the legitimacy of government may also depend up the fair-
ness and even-handedness with which it operates. If some obtain benefits
through corruption, others may view the state as illegitimate and become cor-
rupt as well. As Rothstein (2010) argues, one advantage of universal benefits
is that the state avoids having to decide who qualifies.
2. Empirical studies of the institutional economics of
corruption
Empirical research on the economic determinants of corruption takes several
forms. I describe research based on cross-country indices, studies that con-
centrate on institutional structures, results from surveys and experiments, and
individual sector studies (see Rose-Ackerman 2004; 2006 for more details
and references).
2.1 Cross-country studies
Cross-country research is mostly based on two similar indices of corruption
developed by Transparency International (TI) and by the World Bank Insti-
tute. Both data sets are derived from perceptions of corruption as reported by
the international business community and by experts in particular countries
and regions. Thus, the indices do not represent hard measures of corruption,
but both appear to capture, in a general way, its level as perceived by knowl-
edgeable observers.
These indices have spawned a large number of studies demonstrating that
corruption is associated with harmful outcomes and that institutions matter
for growth. High levels of corruption are associated with lower levels of in-
vestment and growth, and corruption discourages both capital inflows and
foreign direct investment (Lambsdorff 2003a; Mauro 1995; Wei 2000). Ace-
moglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001) find that when the risk of expropria-
tion is high, growth rates tend to be low. Most measures of institutional qual-
ity are correlated, and in this case, expropriation risk and corruption go hand
in hand so that the same association holds for corruption. Corruption lowers
productivity, reduces the effectiveness of industrial policies, and encourages
business to operate in the unofficial sector in violation of tax and regulatory
laws (Ades/Di Tella 1997; Lambsdorff 2003b; Kaufmann 1997).
Highly corrupt countries tend to under-invest in human capital by spend-
ing less on education, to over-invest in public infrastructure relative to private
investment, and to have lower levels of environmental quality (Mauro1997;
Esty/Porter 2002; Tanzi/Davoodi 2002). High levels of corruption produce a
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more unequal distribution of income under some conditions, but the mecha-
nism may be complex – operating through lower investments in education
and lower per capita incomes (Gupta/Davoodi/Alonso-Terme 2002; Gupta/
Davoodi/Tiongson 2001). Corruption can undermine programs explicitly de-
signed to help the poor. For example, Olken (2006) shows how corruption
and theft undermined a rice distribution program in Indonesia. Corruption
and theft apparently turned a welfare-improving program to one that was
welfare-reducing.
Corrupt governments lack political legitimacy (Anderson/Tverdova 2003)
although the political supporters of corrupt incumbent governments, not sur-
prisingly, express more positive views. Surveys carried out in four Latin
American countries in 1998 and 1999 showed that those exposed to corrup-
tion had both lower levels of belief in the political system and lower interper-
sonal trust (Seligman 2002). Surveys of firms in countries making a transition
from socialism provide complementary findings. Firms with close connec-
tions with the government did better than other firms, but countries where
such connections were seen as important for business success did worse
overall than those where political influence was less closely tied to economic
success (Fries/Lysenko/Polanec 2003).
In circumstances of low government legitimacy, citizens try to avoid
paying taxes, and firms go underground to hide from the burden of bureauc-
racy, including attempts to solicit bribes. Using data from the World Values
Survey and Transparency International, Uslaner (2010) shows that high lev-
els of perceived corruption are associated with high levels of tax evasion.
Similarly, Torgler’s (2006) study of attitudes toward tax evasion in Central
and Eastern Europe show that when individuals perceived that corruption was
high, they were less likely to say that people have an obligation to pay taxes.
Thus, one indirect impact of corruption is to persuade people that it is accept-
able not to pay taxes because government has been captured by corrupt offi-
cials and those who support them. As a consequence, corrupt governments
tend to be smaller than more honest governments, everything else equal (Fried-
man/Johnson/Kaufmann/Zoido-Lobaton 2000; Johnson/Kaufmann/McMil-
lan/Woodruff 2000). Thus in corrupt governments, the individual projects are
excessively expensive and unproductive, but the overall size of the govern-
ment is relatively small.
Unfortunately, the consequences of corruption are difficult to distinguish
from the causes; the causal arrow appears to go both ways. Most of the re-
sults reported above could be flipped so that causes become consequences.
An iterative process may operate where corrupt institutions limit growth and
low growth encourages the development of corrupt institutions. Kaufmann,
Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2006) examine the issue of causation econometrically
and claim that the dominant direction of causation is from weak governance,
including high corruption, to low growth. Under this view, the prescriptions
of economists who urge countries to get their macro-economic incentives
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right will not work unless the state has institutions capable of putting such
policies into effect. Even if there is a feedback mechanism from low growth
to high corruption and from high growth to low corruption, the growth proc-
ess cannot begin without reasonably well-functioning institutions.
However, there are distinct limits to cross-country research. It assumes
enough regularity in the phenomenon so that a single statistical model can
cover the world. The relation between macro variables and corruption will
indeed distinguish between very corrupt and very clean states. In the former,
state failure is so pronounced that pro-growth policies cannot be carried out
by the government. In the latter, the state is competent, and citizens support
high taxes because their funds are used effectively to provide public services.
But most countries fall in the middle range, and here the connection is less
clear. Countries with similar rankings have very different institutional envi-
ronments so that corruption is concentrated in different sectors. Furthermore,
indices based on the perceptions of business investors may miss corruption
experienced by ordinary people. This diversity in the middle counsels an em-
phasis on research at the sector and country level.
2.2 Corruption and government structure
Cross-country research does not test the actual mechanism that connects in-
stitutional measures to economic outcomes. Some research, however, has be-
gun to explore these connections. These studies ask whether the specific na-
ture of corrupt deals can help explain their impact and whether a country's
constitutional structure is a determinant of the levels and types of corruption.
Kunicová and Rose-Ackerman (2005) study the links between constitu-
tional structures and voting rules, on the one hand, and perceptions of cor-
ruption on the other. They distinguish between corruption that enriches
elected officials and legal public spending programs with regionally concen-
trated benefits – ‘pork barrel’ politics. Only the former falls under their defi-
nition of corruption. They show that presidential systems are more corrupt,
on balance, than parliamentary democracies and that proportional representa-
tion systems are more corrupt than first-past-the-post systems. The worst
systems combine strong presidents with proportional representation under
which a powerful executive can negotiate with a few powerful party leaders
to share the spoils of office. Their results confirm Persson and Tabellini’s
(2003) finding that proportional representation system are more corrupt than
first-past-the-post systems but contradict their more favorable results for
presidential systems (see also Peters, this volume).
Federalism and decentralization add another dimension. One simple view
derives from work in the political economy of institutions. Drawing on Barry
Weingast’s notion of market-preserving federalism, this view holds that de-
centralization will limit corruption both by making it easier for ordinary peo-
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ple to monitor government officials and by giving them an exit option if offi-
cials are overtly corrupt (Weingast 1995). However, some work finds that
federal states are more corrupt than unitary ones (Treisman 2000). Moreover,
there are conceptual reasons to doubt a strong connection between decentral-
ized government and integrity. Smaller polities may contain more uniform
groups of people so that politics may be less competitive, leading to increased
corruption. Local elites may seize control of a town or village government, but
they may face greater collective action problems in larger government units
(see Peters, this volume). A local kleptocracy may be especially difficult to
control in rural areas in poor countries where wealthy landlords exercise po-
litical power and ordinary people have no realistic exit options (Bardhan and
Mookherjee 2006). 
2.3 Surveys and Experiments
Much recent research uses surveys and experiments to understand how busi-
ness people and ordinary citizens experience and evaluate corruption. Sur-
veys help to capture the way corruption affects different parts of society, and
they highlight the connections between corruption and government legiti-
macy. Experiments permit a more controlled assessment of human behavior,
but they may miss the nuance of real world situations where subtle inter-
personal cues may operate to encourage or discourage payoffs.
The best survey work is based on households’ experience with public of-
ficials, not just individual attitudes. Jennifer Hunt (2006), for example, uses
detailed data from Peru to calculate the ratio of bribes paid to usage rates.
She finds that the judiciary is the most corrupt institution, followed by the
police. Surveys of business firms provide another window on the phenome-
non of corruption. For example, World Bank surveys in Central and Eastern
Europe document the specific ways that corrupt officials and intrusive rules af-
fect businesses and show how corrupt environments impose costs (Hellman/
Jones/ Kaufmann 2003; Hellman/Kaufmann 2004; Johnson/Kaufmann/McMil-
lan/Woodruff 2000).
Surveys demonstrate how firms manage to cope when legal institutions
are weak. Informal relationships built on trust and private sanctions exist but
cannot easily bear the entire burden of maintaining business deals. Weak
states produce widespread corruption, private protection rackets, and the
flouting of regulatory and tax laws. As I noted above, the system may be
caught in a trap in which corruption breeds even more corruption in the fu-
ture until it is all pervasive.
One institution that is particularly important is the security of property
rights. In Eastern and Central Europe countries with more secure property
rights have higher levels of new investment by established firms (John-
son/McMillan/Woodruff 2000; 2002). Property rights are less secure if brib-
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ery and protection payments are common and if the courts do not enforce
contracts. Thus, corruption is not a route to a secure relationship with the
state but opens up possibilities for extortion. Furthermore, if firms pay for
protection, either to private mafias or to the police, this reduces the security
of rights as well (Johnson/McMillan/Woodruff 2002). Trust in the state as a
reliable actor seems important. Firms appear willing to substitute legal and
impartially administered taxes for the uncertainties of bribe payments and the
dangers of relying on private protection services (Friedman/Johnson/Kauf-
mann/Zoido-Lobaton 2000). Thus, when corruption becomes part of the in-
stitutionalized business environment, it has serious feedback effects on the
operation of private markets.
One way to study the impact of institutional arrangements on behavior is
to construct experiments where the institutional environment can be manipu-
lated to study behavioral responses. In the study of corruption, a few experi-
ments exist, and this appears to be a fruitful area for future research. The ex-
periments provide an interesting twist on the large body of research on trust
games (Abbink 2006). Under a common laboratory scenario, payoffs in trust
games are highest if players completely trust each other, but strict rationality
predicts that players will maximize short-term gains by acting in untrust-
worthy ways. Experimental results are usually somewhere in the middle. The
twist is that, in conventional games, trust is a desirable trait, but in corrupt
situations trust permits illegal corrupt deals that are harmful for society. In
the experiments the players exhibit some trust, meaning that they are willing
to make payoffs that are destructive of other goals. Players do not take into
account the social losses of their actions and are most strongly deterred by
the possibility of punishment.
Researchers are beginning to carry out field experiments to see how cor-
ruption affects the delivery of public services or the allocation of licenses.
Much of this work is still in progress, but a study of corruption in obtaining
drivers’ license illustrates their potential (Bertrand/Djankov/Hanna/Mullai-
nathan 2006). That study documented how corruption raised the price of ob-
taining a license and permitted many unqualified drivers to be certified.
2.4 Sector Specific Anti-corruption Policies
Corruption is sometimes discussed as if it were a broad generic concept. In
practice, however, it operates at the sector level. Thus, it is important to study
how the institutional environment creates incentives for corruption in the de-
livery of particular public services, such as education, health, highways, or
national defense. A World Bank publication provides an excellent introduc-
tion to this approach and draws on related work based on analyses of gov-
ernment service delivery, public works, tax collection, and customs (Campos/
Pradhan 2007). This research highlights the importance of melding techno-
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cratic institutional reform based on economic reasoning with a sophisticated
understanding of the politics of systems that permit corruption to persist over
time.
Reinikka and Svensson (2004) carried out a detailed study of the connec-
tion between accountability and corruption in the delivery of public services
based on primary school financing in Uganda. They documented the severe
leakage of central government funds as it was passed down to the grass roots
– one dollar of central government funds only produced $0.13 in budget for
local schools. This finding galvanized public opinion, and central govern-
ment officials took action. They introduced a simple, information-based
strategy combined with better monitoring from the center. After the reform’s
introduction, one dollar expended by the center produced $0.80 of local
school funds, and school enrollment rose. Much of the improvement can be
explained by a newspaper campaign that allowed parents to know how much
money their children’s school was supposed to obtain.
This example shows how institutions interact to produce or to stymie re-
form. An information strategy cannot be effective on its own. In Uganda, al-
ready existing parent-teacher groups used the information to monitor school
spending. In other countries, more costly and complex interventions might be
necessary. Education may be a special case because it is a service used by
children on a daily basis, unlike, say healthcare, where demand is more epi-
sodic, and sick and injured users are vulnerable to exploitation.
Public works are a common locus of corruption. Golden and Picci (2005)
have studied public works in Italy. They combine measures of the physical
public capital stock with measures of historical costs to estimate the relative
efficiency of public spending throughout Italy. Building on research that
finds that corruption and waste go together, they assume that corrupt officials
encourage wasteful projects as a way of generating rents. Overall, the physi-
cal index favors the northern part of the country, and the financial index fa-
vors the south. The ratio of the two provides a rough measure of the relative
levels of corruption and inefficiency. Golden and Picci go on to show that re-
gions with unproductive public spending tend to have more than their share
of deputies accused of corruption. Political corruption is associated with
waste and kickbacks in public contracts.
Tax and customs collection are a frequent locus of payoffs, and interna-
tional financial institutions have many times attempted to reform these ac-
tivities through institutional innovations. Research in Africa and Latin
America has studied the impact of semi-autonomous revenue agencies
(Taliercio, Jr. 2004) and of customs reform (De Wulf/Sokol 2004). The aim
is to limit political interference and to get away from the constraints of the
civil service system. In most cases reforms initially produced gains in reve-
nue collection and falls in corruption. But as with many initiatives, the gains
often were not sustained over time. For example, Fjeldstad (2006) studied the
Uganda Revenue Authority (URA). After marked initial success, revenue be-
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gan to fall, and corruption reemerged. He argues that the relatively high fi-
nancial rewards given to the staff were ineffective in deterring corruption.
Employment in the relatively well-paying URA escalated workers’ obliga-
tions to provide financial support for their extended families creating incen-
tives to take bribes. Political interference and patronage also undermined re-
form goals. The tax law was complex and unclear and left room for
widespread discretion. This encouraged people to use connections to get spe-
cial treatment.
To avoid these political and social dynamics, it is sometimes possible to
turn over an aspect of government operation to an organization located en-
tirely outside the country. Yang (2006) has examined the most prominent
real-world example – private pre-shipment inspection (PSI). PSI firms value
imported goods before they leave their port of origin and then earn a fraction
of the value of the imports. More than 50 developing countries have hired
PSIs over the last two decades. At the aggregate level, these programs appear
successful and cost effective. Reductions in corruption are a prominent cause
of these increases. But success is not guaranteed, and the failures shed light
on the conditions under which such programs are likely to succeed. Yang fo-
cuses on two countries: the Philippines and Colombia. He finds that if PSI
only covers a subset of potential methods of avoiding import duties, then
there can be substantial displacement to alternative methods. Furthermore,
PSI firms and their employees must not be corruptible themselves.
3. Conclusion
The study of corruption is well suited to the institutional economics frame-
work. An understanding of the incidence and effect of corrupt payoffs and
private networks requires one to understand how institutions work – both
formal structures and informal networks. Further, corruption benefits the re-
cipients of bribes and may also benefit those who pay if they can obtain un-
deserved or expedited benefits in return. Hence, on the one hand, corrupt of-
ficials and politicians may seek to reorganize the state to increase the
opportunities for enrichment. On the other hand, satisfied bribe payers have
no incentive to blow the whistle on the practice. As I recognized in my first
1978 book, corruption is an archetypal topic for political economic analysis.
Even if one evokes cultural and social factors, one cannot deny that self-
interest plays a prominent role. Reform may seek to change the norms of of-
ficials and private individuals, but it must also deal with the underlying in-
centives for payoffs by rearranging the rewards and costs of corrupt and hon-
est behavior. Institutional reform is a necessity and must take into account the
insights of institutional economic analysis.
To see how corrupt incentives operate in practice, this chapter has selec-
tively summarized empirical research on corruption that emphasizes the role
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of institutions. Common patterns recur throughout the world and across sec-
tors, so that the lessons learned in one area have relevance elsewhere. But it
is also essential to examine the institutional structure of particular systems or
sectors. The underlying economic incentives for corruption in public works,
the police, the judiciary, tax and customs collection, and procurement are
common throughout the world. Yet the incidence and severity of the problem
vary widely. Effective policy cannot just concentrate on catching and pun-
ishing ‘rotten apples’. Policy must address the underlying conditions that cre-
ate corrupt incentives, or it will have no long-lasting effects. The sorts of
structural and incentive-based policy responses that are outlined here – both
the successes and the failures – can guide governments that are genuinely
committed to reform.
Yet, I end on a note of caution. Clever technical solutions, based on eco-
nomic incentives, may not be enough. If corruption is one of the pillars sup-
porting a political system, it cannot be substantially reduced unless an alter-
native source of revenue replaces it. Powerful groups that lose one source of
patronage will search for another vulnerable sector. Strong moral leadership
is necessary but not sufficient. Tough political and policy choices need to be
faced squarely. It is little wonder that effective and long-lasting corruption
control is a rare and precious achievement. But it is not beyond the power of
determined and intelligent political reformers.
